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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-3558 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY HEWITT, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                        Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A030-114-876) 
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2017 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 14, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Anthony Hewitt petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final 
order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
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Hewitt, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1973, was 
convicted in 2010 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, of 
manufacturing and distributing marijuana equal to or in excess of 5 pounds, in violation 
of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(10), possession of marijuana in excess of 50 
grams, in violation of § 2C:35-10(a)(3), and conspiracy to manufacture and distribute, in 
violation of § 2C:5-2 and § 2C:35-5(a)(1).  Hewitt was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 16 years on the first count, according to the criminal judgment, A.R. 
547.1  The Department of Homeland Security successfully sought his removal on the 
basis of these convictions, and Hewitt did not dispute in Immigration Court that he is 
removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having 
committed a drug trafficking offense as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(B); and INA § 
237(a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance 
other than a single offense for possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana. 
 Hewitt applied primarily for deferral of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture.  He testified about several loving relationships with men, and contended that he 
would be physically harmed, perhaps even murdered, in Jamaica on account of his 
bisexuality because the Jamaican government is unable to control the violent homophobia 
that persists in certain parts of the population.  He testified that he remembered one 
incident where a gay man was tied to a light post and beaten to death by the crowd.  The 
Immigration Judge denied relief and ordered Hewitt’s removal to Jamaica.  The IJ 
reviewed Hewitt’s history of relationships with men and impliedly accepted as credible 
his testimony that he is bisexual, but determined that Hewitt failed in his burden of proof 
                                              
1 Counts 2 and 3 were merged with Count 1 for sentencing, id. 
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to show that he would be tortured in Jamaica on account of his sexual affinity for men.  
The IJ credited Hewitt’s country conditions evidence concerning the mistreatment of gay 
people in Jamaica, but reasoned, citing for authority our decision in Valdiviezo v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 592 (3d Cir. 2011), that his evidence of conditions in general 
did not establish the required likelihood that he in particular would be singled out and 
harmed.  The IJ found that, although Hewitt claimed that people in Jamaica would know 
that he is bisexual, he had never actually been harmed in Jamaica, and no one beyond his 
immediate family knows that he is bisexual. 
 Hewitt appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  He contended that his 
hearing was fundamentally unfair because his counsel did not notify him about the need 
to timely present his witnesses, and that there is a pattern and practice of persecution of 
homosexual men by the Jamaican government.   
In a decision dated August 25, 2016, the Board dismissed the appeal, noting first 
that Hewitt did not challenge the basis for his removal.  The Board further noted that, as 
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, he was ineligible for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i).  Moreover, the Board concluded, his conviction was a 
“particularly serious crime” due to the length of his sentence, which rendered him 
ineligible for withholding of removal under both the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) 
(“[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the 
alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be 
considered to have committed a particularly serious crime.”), and the CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1208.16(d)(2) & 1208.17(a).  The Board determined that Hewitt had not cogently 
challenged his lack of eligibility for these forms of relief, and held that thus any challenge 
 4 
 
to ineligibility was waived.  The Board further concluded that, even if the issue were not 
waived, upon de novo review, Hewitt had not established statutory eligibility for asylum 
or either form of withholding of removal.  
The Board then affirmed the IJ’s denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, 
concluding that there was no clear error in the IJ’s findings of fact, and reasoning that 
Hewitt’s torture claim was based on speculation.  The Board explained that, 
notwithstanding that there is mistreatment of gays and bisexuals in Jamaica, Hewitt had 
never been threatened or harmed in Jamaica and no one beyond his immediate family 
knows that he is bisexual.  The Board rejected Hewitt’s argument that his counsel’s 
alleged malfeasance resulted in a due process violation, determining that he had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements for bringing such a claim, see Matter of 
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), did not provide cogent reasons for failing to do 
so, and, in any event, did not show persuasively that he was prejudiced in any significant 
or dispositive way by counsel’s alleged malfeasance.  Last, the Board rejected Hewitt’s 
vague and unsupported argument that the IJ was biased and that the proceedings were 
unfair. 
 Hewitt has timely petitioned for review.  We generally have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1), but where the petitioner’s removal order is based on a 
conviction for a controlled substance offense or aggravated felony, review is limited to 
colorable constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); 
Green v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012).  Hewitt moved for a stay 
of removal, a motion we denied on September 23, 2016.  His “Petition for an Emergency 
Stay of Removal,” filed after we denied his stay motion, has been treated as his pro se 
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brief.  In it he argues that the agency erred in denying him deferral of removal.  
Specifically, he argues that the IJ improperly discredited two letters he submitted from an 
individual known only as “Dark Sugar,” and failed to take into consideration that his 
sister told him that another of his lovers had been “lynched” on account of his sexual 
orientation, after being deported to Jamaica in 2010.  He also argues, as he did before the 
Board, that his right to due process was violated by his counsel’s failure to adequately 
prepare and present his case.  He further argues that § 2C:35-5(a)(1) is not generically a 
trafficking offense, and he argues, as he did before the Board, that there is a pattern and 
practice of persecution of homosexual men by the Jamaican government. 
We will deny the petition for review.  With respect to Hewitt’s argument that § 
2C:35-5(a)(1) is not generically a trafficking offense and thus that the agency erred in 
finding him removable, the Attorney General has urged us to deem the issue unexhausted 
and forfeited because Hewitt conceded removability in Immigration Court and did not 
pursue this specific question of law before the Board.  Since the Board’s determination 
that Hewitt was statutorily ineligible for asylum rests upon an assumption that his 
conviction for manufacturing and distributing marijuana equal to or in excess of 5 pounds 
is an aggravated felony, we will consider Hewitt’s contention.  Hewitt was convicted 
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35–5(a)(1), which provides that it is unlawful “[t]o 
manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control with intent to 
manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled 
substance analog[.]”  A state offense constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration 
purposes only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under the Controlled 
Substances Act (i.e., imprisonment for more than a year).  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 
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S.Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013).  The statute Hewitt was convicted under “proscribes the 
identical conduct” as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful “to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance.”  Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir.2003).  Although § 
2C:35–5(a)(1) is not categorically an aggravated felony because it also includes 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and distribution of a “small amount” of 
marijuana for no remuneration is only a federal misdemeanor, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4), 
that exception is not at issue here, and Hewitt does not argue otherwise.  The Board 
properly concluded that Hewitt’s conviction is an aggravated felony that precludes 
asylum.  We also agree with the Board that the length of Hewitt’s sentence renders him 
ineligible for both forms of withholding of removal. 
With respect to Hewitt’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT, the 
agency did not commit legal error in concluding that he failed to show that it was more 
likely than not that he would be tortured in Jamaica on account of his bisexuality.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).2  “Torture” consists of the intentional infliction of “severe pain or 
suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  An 
alien need not show that the government possesses actual knowledge of torturous 
conduct; rather, he can establish governmental acquiescence to torture by demonstrating 
that the government is willfully blind to the perpetrator’s activities.  Silva-Rengifo v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 473 F.3d 58, 69 (3d Cir. 2007).   
                                              
2 Hewitt’s pattern or practice of persecution argument is irrelevant in assessing eligibility 
for protection under the CAT, id.  
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 Here, the agency determined that Hewitt’s evidence was insufficient to show that 
he would be harmed in Jamaica, because he had not previously been harmed and because 
no one beyond his immediate family knows that he is bisexual.  Hewitt argues that the IJ 
erred in the weight given to the evidence, but he does not raise a question of law with 
respect to this determination.  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that question of likelihood of torture is a mixed one, comprised of factual 
component (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed”) and legal one (“does 
what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture”).  We see no reviewable 
error in the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish eligibility for CAT 
relief.  The IJ did not overlook or improperly fail to consider authentic and material 
evidence, see Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 636 (3d Cir. 2006).  The IJ 
properly declined to give any weight to two letters from “Dark Sugar,” because they did 
not contain a date, an address, or the legal name of the writer.  In any event, these two 
letters were merely cumulative of other evidence tending to show that Hewitt had loving 
relationships with men and that homophobia persists in Jamaica, A.R. 122-23, which the 
IJ accepted as true. 
Last, Hewitt argues that the assistance he received from his counsel caused a due 
process violation.  Specifically, he argues that his family members were not given the 
opportunity to address the IJ.  A due process claim based on an allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must meet certain procedural requirements.  See Lu v. Ashcroft, 
259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001).  The alien (1) must support the claim with an affidavit 
that sets forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with former counsel with 
respect to the actions to be taken on appeal and what counsel did or did not represent to 
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the petitioner in this regard; (2) must inform former counsel of the allegations and 
provide counsel with the opportunity to respond, and this response should be submitted 
with the motion alleging ineffective assistance, and (3) must state whether a complaint 
has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities, and if not, why not.  Lu, 259 F.3d 
at 132 (citing Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639).  Strict compliance with the requirements 
may be excused where the alien provides a reasonable explanation for his failure to 
comply, Lu, 259 F.3d at 134, but Hewitt offers no explanation whatever for his failure, 
and that by itself is fatal to his petition for review.   
In any event, like the Board, we also are not persuaded that Hewitt showed that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have different had his family 
members testified.  See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Hewitt submitted with his application, and the IJ considered, a letter from his daughter 
Jazzel N. Hewitt, in which she expressed loving concern for him and stated that Jamaican 
culture “does not accept homosexuality in any aspect….  I have so much anxiety seeing 
videos of the riots and crowds going after the ‘public homosexual’ and the torture and 
death being reported.”  A.R. 120.  This letter from a family member tends to show only 
that homophobia persists in Jamaica, which the IJ accepted as true.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
